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Abstract—Nowadays, ubiquitous network access has become
a reality thanks to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that have
gained extreme popularity due to their flexible deployment and
higher chance of Line-of-Sight (LoS) links to ground users.
Telecommunication service providers deploy UAVs to provide
flying network access in remote rural areas, disaster-affected
areas or massive-attended events (sport venues, festivals, etc.)
where full set-up to provide temporary wireless coverage would
be very expensive. Of course, a UAV is battery-powered which
means limited energy budget for both mobility aspect and
communication aspect. An efficient solution is to allow UAVs
swhiching their radio modules to sleep mode in order to extend
battery lifetime. This results in temporary unavailability of
communication feature. Within such a situation, the ultimate
deal for a UAV operator is to provide a cost effective service
with acceptable availability. This would allow to meet some
target Quality of Service (QoS) while having a good market
share granting satisfactory benefits. In this article, we exhibit
a new framework with many interesting insights on how to
jointly define the availability and the access cost in UAV-
empowered flying access networks to opportunistically cover a
target geographical area. Yet, we construct a duopoly model
to capture the adversarial behavior of service providers in
terms of their pricing policies and their respective availability
probabilities. Optimal periodic beaconing (small messages
advertising existence of a UAV) is a vital issue that needs to be
addressed, given the UAVs limited battery capacity and their
recharging constraints. A full analysis of the game outcome, both
in terms of equilibrium pricing and equilibrium availability, is
derived. We show that the availability-pricing game exhibits
some nice features as it is sub-modular with respect to the
availability policy, whereas it is super-modular with respect to
the service fee. Furthermore, we implement a learning scheme
using best-response dynamics that allows operators to learn
their joint pricing-availability strategies in a fast, accurate and
distributed fashion. Extensive simulations show convergence of
the proposed scheme to the joint pricing-availability equilibrium
and offer promising insights on how the game parameters
should be chosen to efficiently control the duopoly game.
Index Terms: UAV, Coverage probability; Service probabil-
ity; Cournot Duopoly; Non-cooperative Game; Pricing Game;
Availability Game; Sub-Modular Game; Super-Modular Game;
Nash Equilibrium; Best Response Dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent few years, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
or drones, have attracted a lot of attention, since they present
ubiquitous usability, high maneuverability and low cost
deployment advantages. UAVs, equipped with navigation
systems and smart sensors, are currently being deployed
for surveillance operations, rescue missions and rapid on
demand communication. Along with the maturity of the
UAVs technology and relevant regulations, they have become
an important market where a UAVs worldwide deployment
is expected. For instance, the registered number of UAVs
in use in the U.S. exceed 200,000 just in the first 20 days
of January 2016, after the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) started requiring owners to sign up [1]. Indeed, UAVs
can be deployed fruitfully to support cellular communication
systems when terrestrial infrastructure networks are damaged.
Moreover it supports wireless communication in exceptional
scenarios such as hard to reach rural areas, festivals or
sporting events and emergency situations where the terrestrial
base stations installation may be too expensive. In this
context, UAVs as flying base stations have been reported as a
promising approach that can boost the capacity and coverage
performance of existing wireless networks. using UAVs as
aerial base stations provides several benefits such as high
maneuverability and robustness, flexible deployment, efficient
on demand telecommunication and also mobility [2].
Thanks to their high mobility and air location, UAVs
are likely to have good communication channel since
the UAV-ground link is more likely to have line-of-sight
(LoS) links [3]. Furthermore, UAVs provide unlimited
telecommunication applications for their advantage to
efficiently sense information about surrounding environment.
They are now a key technology for intelligence, recognition,
search, inspection tasks, surveillance, public services, and so
on. Another key feature of UAVs is the Internet of Things
(IoT) Which is a technological revolution that has made
the leap from conceptual to actual (see [4] and [5]). IoT
enables devices to exchange data and inter-operate within the
internet infrastructure, which affords ubiquitous connectivity
while reducing the transmission cost and providing extended
range for low- power communication. Technically, UAVs
play an important role in the Internet of Things vision. It
offers flexible deployability and re-programming in mission
possibilities to deliver numerous operating solutions and
services, for IoT partners.
While deploying drones as flying base stations offers
numerous advantages, still a number of economic and
technical challenges arise. These challenges comprise
not only technical and physical issues, but also effective
pricing and availability management features. Yet, for UAVs
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service providers to overcome these relevant challenging
issues, availability or beaconing scheduling becomes a
very important but largely unexplored topic. For this,
comprehensive modeling and performance analysis of UAVs
setups has become extremely attractive. In this article we
provide a UAVs joint pricing and availability problem,
considering their limited battery capacity. We focus on the
scheduling of availability periods as a key enabler that can
potentially lead to better energy efficiency and then, to a better
long-term availability (time-life) as well as a satisfactory
quality of service. More precisely, we are interested in the
joint Pricing-Availability problem for UAV-based network
market. Then, we design a new scheme that jointly considers
and solves the UAV’s pricing and energy-efficient issue.
In order to address this issues, we examine the availability
and pricing interactions between service providers as a non-
cooperative game. We propose a duopoly setup, where a finite
network of mobile unmanned aerial vehicles are deployed
according to a homogeneous Poisson Point Processes (PPP),
and serving a number of ground IoT devices. The UAVs are
moving according to a Random Waypoint (RWP) model.
As a first proposal, we derive the coverage probability
expression as well as the service probability for each UAV
in the current scenario. In order to achieve the maximum
system performance in terms of pricing policy and energy
efficiency, our proposal introduces Nash equilibrium analysis.
Furthermore, we propose a learning automata to derive the
joint Price-Availability Equilibrium. Finally, we provide
extensive numerical simulations to highlight the importance
of taking Price - Availability as a joint decision parameters
and provide thereby important insights/heuristics on how to
set them.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
In section II we give an overview of the proposed UAVs
duopoly system model and strategic Pricing-Availability. In
section III we present the Availability game analysis, existence
and uniqueness of NE solution and also define the game
sub-modularity characteristics. Furthermore Pricing game is
provided in section IV, the property of super-modularity was
discussed mathematically as well analytically. Section V con-
siders a joint Availability-Pricing approach with numerical
learning implementations, we further gave the impact on some
important parameters on he learning process. finally section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A significant existing literature investigates interesting fea-
tures on UAVs technological performance and reducing cost.
For instance, authors in [6] study energy-efficient UAV com-
munication via optimizing the UAV’s trajectory, for this, they
consider a UAV trajectory with general constraints, under
which the UAV’s flight radius and speed are jointly optimized.
An important study of the UAV’s obstacle avoidance plan is
conducted in [7], where the writers propose algorithm based
on Iterative Regional Inflation by Semidefinite in order to
improve the fighting efficiency. A useful derivative-free one,
sliding mode control (SMC) theory-based learning algorithm,
for the control and guidance of a UAV is proposed in [8]. Ro-
bustness, in real-time applications and finite time convergence
were proven trough intensive simulations. An other learning
approach is treated in [9] where the authors provide a thorough
review on deep learning methods for UAVs, including the
most relevant developments as well as their performances and
limitation. An important issue which is IoT applications is
discussed [10]. This paper investigate the efficient deployment
and mobility of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
in order to enable reliable uplink communications for the
IoT devices with a minimum total transmit power. Another
IoT related work is in [11], it presents the features that a
UAV system should implement for drone traffic management,
namely the air traffic control network, the cellular network,
and the Internet. In [12] the authors introduce different classi-
fications of Internet of Things with examples of utilizing IoT
technologies. They refer to the concept of global-scaled IoT,
where using Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) offers a large
coverage and more flexibility thanks to the mobility approach.
The UAV based IoT concept has been further studied in paper
[13] that provides a comprehensive survey on the UAVs and
the related issues. It highlights potential for the delivery of
UAV-based value-added IoT service from height.
III. AVAILABILITY-PRICING GAME AMONG UAV
OPERATORS
A. The Flying Access Network Framework
1) Coverage probability: Consider a circular geographical
area with a radius R within which a number N of wireless
users are deployed according to a homogeneous Poisson Point
Processes (PPP) with density of u (number of users per m2).
In this area, a set of UAVs moving randomly according to a
Random Waypoint mobility model, are used as aerial mobile
base stations to provide wireless service for the ground IoT
devices (see figure 1). The drones are belonging to different
operators and are engaged to provide an effective coverage
for mobile IoT users. In this setting the drones have the same
characteristics such as altitude h, total available bandwidth and
maximum transmit power.
The coverage probability is formally defined as:
P covu (γu) = P (γu ≥ β) (1)
Here γu = PuN+I is the SINR expression for a device user
that connects to the UAV, where Pu is the received signal
power from the UAV including fading and path-loss, N is the
noise power and I is the total interference power from existing
transmitters. β refers to the SINR threshold.
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Fig. 1. Using UAV for Ubiquitous Network Access in IoT Environments.
According to [14], for an up-link user located at (r, φ), the
coverage probability is given by:
P covu (r, φ, β) =PLoS(r, φ)1
[
r ≤
(
Pu
βN
)]
+
PNLoS(r, φ)1
[
r ≤
(
Pu
βN
)]
.
(2)
Here r and φ are the radius and angle in a polar coordinate
system, the UAV is located at the center of the area of interest.
PLoS respectively PNLoS are the line-of-sight, respectively
Non-Line-of-Sight probabilities.
The average coverage probability is computed by taking the
average of P covu (r, φ, β) over the area with the radius R:
P covu (r, φ, β) =[E]r,φ[P
cov
u (r, φ, β)]
=
∫ min[( PuβN ) 1αu ,R]
0
PLoS(r, φ)
2r
R2
dr
+
∫ min[( ηPuβN ) 1αu ,R]
0
PNLoS(r, φ)
2r
R2
dr,
(3)
where αu is the path loss exponent over the user-UAV
link. η is an additional attenuation factor due to the NLoS
connection. Pu is the UAV transmit power.
The air-to-ground signal propagation is almost affected
by obstacles in surrounding environment. Thus a common
approach for channel modeling between the UAV and down-
link users is based on probabilistic direct Line of Sight (LoS)
and Non Line of Sight (NLoS) links. Whereby each Link
may occur with a specific probability which depends on the
propagation environment, the UAV and users locations, and
the elevation angle (here θ).
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Fig. 2. beaconing cycle schedule
In this scenario we suppose designing a UAV-based com-
munication system in a remote rural area where full set-up to
provide temporary wireless coverage would be very expensive.
Due to its higher altitude and the low average height of build-
ing in hard to reach rural areas, UAV has higher probability of
direct line-of-sight links to ground users. The probability of
NLoS component occurrence is therefore significantly lower
than that of the LoS component. For simplicity we ignore
the small scale NLoS and as evident the coverage probability
formula would be significantly simplified as bellow:
P covu (r, φ, β) =
∫ min[( PuβN ) 1αu ,R]
0
PLoS(r, φ)
2r
R2
dr. (4)
2) Service probability: Given the limited capacity and
recharging difficulties of a UAV battery, periodic beaconing
is one of the most challenging problem that needs to be
addressed. Each UAV i is periodically sending beacons of
duration τi advertising his presence to mobile IoT devices.
The beacon/idle cycle is periodically repeated every time slot
T during a time window: m = l∗T (see figure 2). UAVs should
define their beaconing periods strategically in order to maxi-
mize their encounter rate with the IoT ground users. However,
they should avoid battery depletion resulting from maintaining
useless beaconing in the absence of contact opportunities.
The first encounter follows an exponential distribution with
a random parameter λ. In order for a UAV i to encounter first
the ground IoT destination at time τi, the following conditions
must hold:
• The UAV i has to be beaconing at τi;
• All potential encounters with ground destination,
happening before time instant τi, by the other UAVs
need to be unsuccessful. In other words, the encounters
need to happen while UAV i’s competitors are inactive).
Consequently, the successful contact probability is given by:
P srvi =
[
P (Ti ≤ Tj) + P (Ti ≥ Tj).P slpj
]
.P bcni .P
cov
i . (5)
For mathematical calculations, we focus on the case of two
operators (UAVi and UAVj), this minimizes mathematical
complication but still allows us to analyze the important
features of Operators strategies. We define the probability of
UAVi beaconing while encountering for the first time the
destination within [0; m]:
P bcni =
l-1∑
s=0
(∫ s∗T+τi
s∗T
λi e
-λix dx
)
= -
eλiT
(
e-mλi - e-λi(m+τi) -1 + e-λiτi
)
eλiT -1
. (6)
For a UAVi, the probability of being idle is given by:
P slpi =
l-1∑
s=0
(∫ (s+1)∗T
s∗T+τi
λi e
-λix dx
)
=
eλiT
(
- e-λi(m+τi)+e-λi(m+T )+e-λiτi - e-λiT
)
eλiT -1
.(7)
The probability that UAVi encounters first the ground
destination without accounting for its state (probing/idle) is
expressed as follows:
P (Ti ≤ Tj) = λj e
-m(λi+λj)+(-λi-λj) e
-λjm+λi
λi + λj
(8)
And finally we define The probability that UAVi encounters
first the ground destination without accounting for its state :
P (Ti ≥ Tj) = λi e
-m(λi+λj)+(-λi-λj) e
-λim+λj
λi + λj
. (9)
B. The Game Formulation
1) Customers behavior: Most telecommunications markets
are oligopolistic, this means, dominated by a certain number
of service providers called oligopolists. In order to maximize
benefits, the competition between service providers is
becoming increasingly tough. From an oligopolist point of
view, increasing market share is the most important objective.
Thus, service providers are supposed to define the optimal
pricing policy and the best QoS (represented by availability)
requested in order to attract more and more customers.
Because customers are rational by nature, they are likely to
register to an operator rather than the others or to stay at no
subscription state according to their own satisfaction (servie
price, Quality of Service, Quality of experience).
In this paper, we assume a duopoly telecommunication
market where just two Service Providers compete against one
another to provide service for IoT ground users. Each UAV i
belonging to SP i picks its availability duration τi represented
by the periodic beaconing time chosen within intervalle
[0, T ], and a service fee per data unit fi ∈ [0, fmax].
Formally, SPs are intelligent individuals in conflict, this
situations is involving rational decisions.
Non cooperative Game theory provides the appropriate
tools for determining optimal behavior in such competitive
environments. It provides mathematical methodology for
modeling and analyzing interactions between intelligent
rational players in interests conflict. This branch of game
theory deals largely with how intelligent individuals interact
with one another in an effort to achieve their own goals.
Players are selfish and each individual player makes decisions
independently without forming alliances.
We capture the Pricing-Availability interaction among two
UAV operators as a normal form game. Each SP seeks to
choose the level of service allowing a reasonable battery
lifetime while maximizing its monetary profits, given the
action of the competitor. The non-cooperative game is formally
defined as follows:
G =
〈
N , A, U
〉
. (10)
where:
• N = {1, 2} is the set of players (UAV operators);
• A =
{
[0, T ]× [0, fmax]
}2
;
• U = (U1, U2) is the vector of payoffs defined as the
difference between their respective profits and costs.
Increasing the experienced market demand is the most im-
portant objective of each operator. Then, from an operator
perspective, the question is to define the best beaconing
duration and the best pricing policy that attracts a high portion
of subscribers. Ideally, one UAV would like to simultaneously
maximize the proposed fee and minimize the total consumed
energy. However, these are two conflicting objectives, since
ground users are likely to be rational. Inspired by Logit model
[15], we model the probability pii that a given IoT device is
registering with service provider i which can also be seen as
the market share of a UAV i. The demand function follows an
exponential distribution with parameter µ. This last parameter
is called the constant hazard or temperature, which defines the
users rationality, so that, the higher is µ , the less users are
rational.
pii =
exp
(
- fiµ
)
2∑
j=1
exp
(
-
fj
µ
) . (11)
The average number of customers that are registering to
UAV i is N.pii. Because UAVs compete in quality of service
and price, it seems to be obvious that the experienced demand
depends on these parameters. However, it depends also on
the environment variables.
2) Service providers strategic decision: We are interested
in the problem of optimal Pricing-beaconing in fixed-wing
UAVs that should avoid battery depletion resulting from
maintaining useless activity duration in the absence of contact
with the ground. We propose a new design paradigm that
considers both the UAV ′s Pricing and energy-efficient
problems.
The UAV is periodically sending beacons advertising his
presence to mobile users on the ground. From a UAV per-
spective, there is a trade-offs between the strategic parameters
τ and energy consumption. On one hand, as the beacon
duration increases, the coverage chance Pcov as well as the
service probability increase. On the other hand, total energy
consumption is mainly proportional to the activity period
duration. The same for the service price, where increasing the
pricing policy value may increase revenues but in the same
time negatively affect the experienced market demand. Here,
the strategy space and the reward are common knowledge,
however the chosen beaconing period and taxed fee are not
since decisions are taken simultaneously. The Utility of each
UAV SP is a function of its own strategy as well as the
decisions of the other.
Ui(τi, τj , fi, fj) = pii
∑
IoTi∈Ri
P srvi (τi, τj).fi-Ei. (12)
Ei is the dissipated energy for a UAVi:
Ei =
[(
1-
∏
i∈Ri
(1-pu)
)
.r +
∑
u∈Ri
θu,iAck
]
.P srvi +
b.pii(τ) + s.
(13)
Here θu,i = pu
∏
k 6=u
(1-pk) is the normalized throughput of
user u served by a UAV i. We denote by b, the energy
cost per slot for sending beacons, r is the reception en-
ergy, Ack is the transmission energy cost and s is the
unit energy for remaining swhiching the transceiver status.
Ri = (Useru, d(Useru, UAVi) ≤ r) is the set of ground
IoT devices served by a given drone i.
IV. AVAILABILITY GAME WITH FIXED FEE
In literature the pricing shelduding is almost the key
parameter that affects straightly operators revenues. However
the realism of this assumption is sometimes questioned
[16]. Indeed, similar market price may affect the customers
perceptions about the UAVs’ availability and then, their
loyalty. Due to a rough competition, availability has started
to become an important strategic tool for operators to expand
their market share. We examine energy-efficient-Pricing trade-
offs within a non-cooperative game framework. This incites
operators to make efforts in providing better QoS while fixing
optimal periodic advertising beacons. The proposed approach
is realistic enough to analyze the interplay of Availability on
service providers revenues. The problem is then, to determine
for each UAV, the optimal availability (beaconing period)
while rival behaves optimally, this represents exactly the Nash
equilibrium status.
Recall that Nash equilibrium strategy is the best response
of each UAV to the expected best-response behavior of the
other.
Proposition 1: The availability game admits at least one
Nash Equilibrium.
Proof 1: To show the existence of an equilibrium, the suf-
ficient condition is the quasi-concavity of the utility function.
We notice that, the strategy set [0;T ] is a convex, close and
compact interval. Furthermore, the utility function is continue
with respect to τi. In addition we show that the second
derivative with τi is negative. After calculation, the second
derivative is expressed as bellow:
∂2Ui(τi, τj)
∂τ2i
=
∂2P srvi (τi, τj)
∂2τi
(Nfipii-ψi) , (14)
where
ψi =
[(
1-
∏
i∈Ri
(1-pu)
)
.r +
∑
u∈Ri
θu,iAck
]
. (15)
It has been easily proven that the second derivative of the
service probability with respect to τi is of negative sign, and
therefore for the second derivative to be negative, it could be
sufficient to make sure that the following condition fulfill
Nfipii-ψi ≥ 0. (16)
This condition seems logical since the demand is positive
and each operator requires a certain demand threshold as
an incentive to deploy a drone resource, this means that
for a UAV operator to be motivated to coverage a certain
area the minimum required demand equals at least the
cost of energy that he is going to waste. From this, the
utility function of a UAV i belonging to an operator i is
quasi concave, and then admits a local optimum point at τ∗i
which is its best response against strategies of other operators.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of Availability-termed Nash
equilibrium): The availability game is dominance solvable
[17] and consequently, satisfies Rosen’s diagonal strict
concavity condition. Henceforth it has a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof 2: The dominance solvability condition is given by:
-
∂2Ui(τi, τj)
∂τ2i
-
∣∣∣∣∂2Ui(τi, τj)∂τj∂τi
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0, (17)
when
∂2Ui(τi, τj)
∂τ2i
=
∂2P srvi (τi, τj)
∂2τi
(Nfipii-ψi), (18)
and
∂2Ui(τi, τj)
∂τj∂τi
=
∂2P srvi (τi, τj)
∂τj∂τi
(Nfipii-ψi). (19)
The dominance solvability conditions are verified and
consequently, the concave game G satisfies Rosen’s diagonal
strict concavity condition for the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium.
Interactions among UAVs in this non-cooperative game
have a very attractive property, if one UAV reduces its
availability (beaconing period), the other UAV also has an
interest in decreasing its own. Informally, this type of games
led us to conclude that it is about sub-modular games.
Lemma 1: The game G with N mobile devices and two
UAVs service providers is sub-modular.
Proof 3: To prove the Sub-modularity of the game, we
compute the second order mixed derivative of Ui(·) with
respect to two beaconing durations τi and τj . With the mixed
derivative expression given in (19), it is straightforward to
conclude that it is effectively about a sub-modular game.
With sub-modularity, the best response of a UAV is a de-
creasing function of the other UAV availability strategy (bea-
coning period). Consequently, this game possesses a unique
equilibria that best response dynamic learning scheme can
reach with probability 1.
V. PRICING GAME WITH FIXED AVAILABILITY PERIOD
Despite the several advantages of availability competition,
still the price is a more common strategical decision in
telecommunication business. This motivates us to investigate
the pricing game with fixed availability parameter. We argue
in this section that, operators set prices and let the consumers
decide on their experienced demand. That is, each operator is
maximizing its profit believing that its competitor is doing the
same. Conceptually, this situation is a typical Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium (see papers in [18] and [19]). We turn first to
mathematically analyze the equilibrium existence.
Proposition 3: The Pricing game admits at least one Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof 4: The strategy set represented in [0; fmax] is convex,
closed and compact interval. In addition the utility function is
continue with fi. Furthermore, we show that the second deriva-
tive with respect to fi has a negative sign. After calculation,
∂pii(fi, fj)
∂fi
= -
1
µ exp
(
- fiµ
)
exp
(
-
fj
µ
)
[
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
)]2 , (20)
∂2pii(fi, fj)
∂f2i
=
exp
(
- fiµ
)
exp
(
-
fj
µ
) [
exp
(
-
2fj
µ
)
- exp
(
- 2fiµ
)]
µ2
[
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
)]4 .
(21)
The second order derivative is expressed as bellow:
∂2Ui(fi, fj)
∂f2i
= N.P srvi (τi, τj) ·
[
2
∂pii
∂fi
+ fi
∂2pii
∂2fi
]
=
N.P srvi exp
(
- fiµ
)
exp
(
-
fj
µ
)
µ
(
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
))2 .
fi
(
exp
(
-2
fj
µ
)
- exp
(
-2 fiµ
))
µ
(
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
))2 -2
 ,(22)
which is clearly negative. Hence the profit function of each
UAV is quasi-concave with respect to its own fee, and then
the NE existence.
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness of Price-based Nash
equilibrium): The Pricing game has a unique Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof 5: The utility function satisfies the dominance solv-
ability conditions and consequently satisfies Rosens conditions
defined as:
-
∂2Ui(fi, fj)
∂f2i
-
∣∣∣∣∂2Ui(fi, fj)∂fj∂fi
∣∣∣∣
=
N.P srvi exp
(
- fiµ
)
exp
(
-
fj
µ
)
[
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
)]2 ≥ 0. (23)
A remarkable property of this game is that when one player
picks a higher action, the others has incentive to follow and
do the same. Roughly, this introduces the notion of a super-
modular game characterized by strategic complementarities.
Lemma 2: The game G with N mobile devices and two
UAVs service providers is super-modular.
Proof 6: To prove the Super-modularity of the game, we
compute the second order mixed derivative of Ui with respect
to its proposed fee ant that of its competitor (fi and fj). With
the following mixed derivative expression, which is clearly of
positive sign, we argue that it is a super-modular game.
∂2Ui(fi, fj)
∂fj∂fi
=
N.P srvi exp
(
- fiµ
)
exp
(
-
fj
µ
)
µ
[
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
)]2 .
1-fi
[
exp
(
-2
fj
µ
)
+ exp
(
-2 fiµ
)]
µ
[
exp
(
- fiµ
)
+ exp
(
-
fj
µ
)]2
 .
(24)
Super-modularity tends to be analytically appealing. An inter-
esting property is that it behaves well under various learning
rules. Furthermore, convergence towards Nash equilibrium
point is guaranteed under best response dynamics.
VI. JOINT PRICING-AVAILABILITY GAME
A. Insights on Real-World Implementation: Fully Distributed
Learning
Learning is a fundamental component of intelligence and
cognition; it is defined as the ability of synthesizing the
acquired knowledge through practice, training, or experience
in order to improve the future behavior of the learning
agent. In this section we introduce a learning scheme [20],
[21] aiming to understand the behavior of users during
the interactions and to reach the eventual convergence
toward Nash Equilibrium. The goal is that UAVs service
providers learn their own payoffs and determine the NE
joint Availability-pricing strategy. To accomplish this, Best
Response Algorithm is a suitable class; it leads to Nash
Equilibrium status by exploiting fast monotony of best
response functions. In fact, NE concept is implicitly based on
the assumption that players follow best-response dynamics
until they reach a state from which, no player can improve
his utility by changing unilaterally his strategy [22].
Algorithm 1 summarizes the best response dynamics that
each service provider performs in order to converge to the
game Nash equilibrium. The best-response strategy of a player
is defined as its optimal one, given the strategies of the other
players. At a time iteration t, each service provider chooses the
best joint Availability-Pricing strategy against the opponents
strategies chosen at previous round t-1. It is worth to notice
that convergence of the best response dynamics is granted for
s-modular games [23].
Algorithm 1 Best Response Dynamics
Initialisation:
Service Provider i initializes fi and τi at random values;
Learning pathern:
for t=0,1,2,....m
(
f t+1i , τ
t+1
i
)
= argmax
fi,τi
U ti
(
fi, f
t
j , τi, τ
t
i
)
. (25)
end for
Best Response Algorithm exhibits enormous advantages as
it offers an accurate and fast convergence to the unique Nash
equilibrium point. We say UAVs learn to play an equilibrium,
if after a given number of iterations, the strategy profile
converges to an equilibrium status.
B. Numerical Investigations
The Pricing-Availability Best-response learning results
are provided using MATLAB software. Parameters used
in the simulation are set based on typical values such as
T = 1,m = 100, fmin = 0 and fmax = 10. Here, we
will analyze the impact of the various parameters especially
market temperature, coverage probability and encounter rates
on the Nash equilibrium Price as well as the provided QoS
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Fig. 3. NE price with temperature parameter under best response dynamic
for two homogeneous operators
Time iterations
100 101
N
E
 B
ea
co
ni
ng
 p
er
io
d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
UAV1 (µ=2)
UAV2 (µ=2)
UAV1 (µ=3)
UAV2(µ=3)
UAV1 (µ=6)
UAV2 (µ=6)
µ=6
µ=3
µ=2
Fig. 4. NE beaconing period with temperature parameter under best response
dynamic for two homogeneous operators
(measured by beaconing periods) for both competitors.
Under this setup, Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of service
providers under best response algorithm and the convergence
towards the Nash Equilibrium Price with time iterations. Here
we consider symmetric operators with randomly generated
initial points. A smaller temperature µ value means that
consumers are more and more rational so that the operators NE
Price tends towards lower values. Indeed with µ = 2 the NE
price is absolutely zero (= fmin). However when µ becomes
greater (consumers are less rational) the NE price arises and
reaches its maximal value with µ = 6. The same applies to
Figure 4, where we depict the convergence of Algorithm 1
towards Nash Equilibrium beaconing periods with different
values of µ. After some time iterations the two UAVs converge
accurately to the same Nash equilibrium beaconing period.
With µ = 2 the τ∗ is zero however τ∗ is increasing with µ. By
linking that with the NE price analysis, we can say that, with
an increasing Availability periods, operators propose greater
prices.
We depict in figures 5 and 6 the individual best response
prices respectively beaconing periods for two asymmetric
UAVs. Each UAV has a different coverage probability
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Fig. 6. NE price under best response dynamic for asymetric operators
coverages
value ( may be due to high parameter for example).
Counterintuitively, figure 5 shows that the NE price does
not depend on the coverage probability. Even with different
coverage probabilities, the two competitors converge towards
the same equilibrium price, this last value is increasing with
UAV’s coverage which is quite intuitive.
However, equilibrium beaconing periods illustrated in
figure 6 are different with UAVs of different coverage
probabilities. It is worth notice that, the UAV with greater
coverage, converges to a higher beaconing NE value, thus,
offers a better QoS (availability service). We we exclude
from this analysis the case with small value of parameter
µ where the two operators converge to null values. Yet the
greater is the coverage (likely UAV high), the longer is the
NE beaconing availability advertising periods.
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of both µ and the encounter
rate λi on the NE price on each UAV i in an asymmetric
setup (One UAV have an encounter rate advantage over the
other). We remark that, even with different encounter rates,
the NE prices are the same however the NE with a minimum
temperature is greater than that of symmetric case.
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Fig. 8. NE beaconing periods under best response dynamic for inhomoge-
neous operators encounter rates
We plot in figure 8 the beaconing best response learning
evolution for two inhomogeneous UAVs (One UAV have an
encounter rate advantage over the other), the NE beaconing
periods are straightforward affected by µ as well as λ. Thus,
with a greater µ and λ the best response converge to a high
value of τ∗ however the NE beaconing period for a UAV
with smaller λ is always lower.
In order to study the evolution impact of parameter µ on the
learning results, figure 9 respectively figure 10 illustrates the
NE price respectively NE beaconing period versus temperature
parameter for two symmetric UAVs and different IoT popula-
tion sizes. The results in figure 9 show that with temperature
parameter smaller than a certain threshold(for example µ = 2
for N = 50) the NE price is in its minimum value, and from
this point the price is increasing until the maximum price
value (fmax) (for example µ = 6 for N=50). In this figure we
argue that, with a greater population density the price tends to
converge faster to the maximum value. That findings impact
obviously the beaconing period evolution illustrated in figure
10. With a greater population the NE Beaconing increases and
reaches the equilibrium status in a smaller time window.
Pricing and beaconing learning evolution under different
Temperatute µ
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Fig. 9. NE Price evolution for operators with respect to µ in different
populations sizes
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Fig. 10. NE beaconing periods evolution for operators with respect to µ in
different populations sizes
coverage probability values are illustrated in figures 11,
respectively 12. In figure 11, the NE price is minimal with
low coverage and from a certain coverage probability value
(nearly 0.6) the best strategy tends to fmax. However, figure
12 shows clearly the linear impact of Pcov on NE beaconing
strategies. This last are increasing with Pcov , that confirms
results in figure 5.
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Fig. 12. NE beaconing period with coverage probability parameter under best
response dynamic for two homogeneous operators
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Fig. 13. NE Price evolution for operators with coverage probability and
different populations sizes
Figure 13 respectively figure 14 illustrates the NE price
with coverage probability respectively NE beaconing period
for two symmetric UAVs and different IoT population sizes.
These two figures are provided to study the impact of coverage
probability on the learning results while considering fmin = 2.
Figure 13 shows clearly the ”natural” impact of population
density on the service price, with a greater population the
operators can set a greater prices. Furthermore an interesting
finding in figure 14 is that, with a grater population the
NE beaconing duration is maximized, confirming thereby, the
results in figure 13. It is worth mentioning how fast and
accurate the proposed algorithm is for the convergence to the
unique Nash equilibrium, which provides numerous insights
on how to implement it and measure its effictiveness.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we deal with the Pricing-Availability
interaction among adversarial unmanned aerial vehicles
acting as flying base stations. we construct a theoretic
framework based on non-cooperative game theory and
characterize the equilibrium strategies for each UAV, both
in terms of equilibrium fees and equilibrium availability
probability. Furthermore, a special feature is obtained as
the availability game with fixed price is sub-modular while
Coverage probability
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
N
E
 b
ea
co
ni
ng
 p
er
io
d
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of IoT devices N = 30
Number of IoT devices N = 50
Number of IoT devices N = 1000
Fig. 14. NE beaconing periods evolution for operators with coverage
probability and different populations sizes
the pricing game is super-modular under fixed availability.
Next, we check that a simple iterative best response-based
algorithm allows to explore the unique Nash equilibrium of
the game. Performance evaluation at equilibrium results allow
UAVs service providers to optimize their energy consumption
while maximizing their monetary revenues.
As a future work, we are generalizing our proposal while
considering heterogeneous mobility motions. Furthermore,
some field experiments are also envisioned.
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